The existing literature on R&D networks has focused on networks among …rms who compete in the product market (downstream networks). This article develops the literature by casting the analysis in the context of a vertically related industry, where both downstream …rms and their upstream suppliers can form horizontal R&D networks.
Introduction
The incentives for R&D cooperation among competing …rms have been studied extensively in the literature. The main message is that, in the absence of R&D cooperation, research activity creates involuntary knowledge spillovers. The creation of such spillovers -which contribute positively to the R&D stock of rival …rms -imply that innovating …rms cannot appropriate fully the returns from R&D. This suggests that R&D cooperation can help to internalize spillovers.
A generic …nding is that su¢ ciently large spillovers make R&D cooperation worthwhile and thereby expand both R&D spending and social welfare (see e.g. d'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al., 1992; Suzumura, 1992; and Belderbos et al., 2004 , for empirical evidence). 1 During the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, we witnessed a substantial increase in the number of R&D alliances. The upsurge in R&D alliances re ‡ects that non-equity forms of collaboration, such as R&D networks, are steadily becoming more popular relative to equity forms, such as research joint ventures (RJVs hereafter). 2 This empirical pattern has led to the so-called "age of alliance capitalism" (Dunning, 1995; Narula and Duysters, 2004) , where hi-tech companies engage in a variety of research projects to share know-how and enhance technological capabilities. A related observation is that in many industries the "locus of innovation"is not so much the …rm (i.e. a single entity) but a network of R&D alliances where the …rm is embedded (Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996) .
The growth of R&D partnerships through networks is also re ‡ected in the development of a new strand of literature, distinct from that of RJVs. 3 The …rst study to investigate the impact of product-market competition on R&D network formation is that of Goyal and MoragaGonzález (2001) . In their pioneering work, they considered a three-stage game: in stage one, …rms choose their bilateral collaborative links, prior to undertaking their R&D investments in stage two, and then competing in a Cournot fashion (stage 3). The focus of the analysis is on the relationships between market competition, R&D incentives and network architecture. …rms compete in the product market. 4 We develop this literature by casting the analysis in the context of a vertically related industry, and by allowing not only downstream but also upstream …rms to form horizontal R&D networks. We analyze the …rms' network formation decisions at both market tiers simultaneously, because the upstream R&D network may have an impact on the "stability" of the downstream network (and vice versa). Intuitively, a more successful upstream …rm (through its R&D network) can transform its downstream counterpart into a more aggressive competitor. At the same time, a more successful downstream …rm, who bene…ts from its horizontal collaborations with other …rms, can secure greater pro…t for its upstream supplier. We address the following questions: Which network architectures will emerge endogenously at the upstream and downstream market tier of a vertically related industry? Do equilibrium networks maximize the aggregate level of e¤ective R&D, industry pro…ts and/or social welfare?
A natural way to examine which R&D network architectures will emerge endogenously is to adopt Jackson and Wolinsky's (1996) concept of pairwise stability. This concept allows at most a pair of …rms to alter the network structure at a time. We also enrich the network formation process by adopting the concept of strong stability developed by Jackson and Van de Nouweland (2005) , which allows any coalition of …rms to deviate between alternative network formations.
In the context of a model consisting of three upstream and three downstream …rms, we show that, under certain conditions, di¤erent industry structures can be "stable"as upstream and/or downstream spillovers vary. Speci…cally, if R&D spillovers within-the-upstream network are suf…ciently large while R&D spillovers within-the-downstream network are su¢ ciently small, then downstream …rms as well as their corresponding upstream suppliers may form horizontal R&D networks which are partially connected. A partial network architecture is asymmetric in that it includes two of the …rms (at each market tier) but excludes the third. Yet if R&D spillovers within-the-upstream network are su¢ ciently small, then more R&D links will be established within the industry (to o¤set the lower degree of spillovers): that is, both the downstream …rms and their upstream suppliers will opt for complete R&D networks. Finally, when upstream spillovers are su¢ ciently large but downstream spillovers are intermediate, then the equilibrium upstream network is likely to be di¤erent from the downstream network. Speci…cally, we show that a partial upstream network might coexist with a complete downstream network. We may conclude that R&D spillovers, both within the upstream and downstream R&D network, play an important, yet complex role, in explaining the …rms'network formation decisions.
Closest in spirit to our approach is the article by Mauleon, Sempere-Monerris and Vannetelbosch (2008) -hereafter MSV -who extend and enrich the existing literature by studying network formation in the presence of …rm-level labour unions. 5 The authors show that, as long as each …rm settles its own wage, the partial R&D network arises as a strongly stable architecture, 6 whereas the complete R&D network emerges when all the relevant bargaining power rests with the unions. This implies that stronger unions may promote the formation of R&D networks. Like MSV, we also cast the analysis in the context of a vertically related industry, but focus instead on the network formation decisions of both downstream …rms and their upstream suppliers (who represent labour unions in MSV).
As well as having theoretical signi…cance, we suggest that the present analysis is of empirical value in light of the observed proliferation of R&D alliances in vertically related industries. The upsurge in R&D alliances is perhaps most obvious in hi-tech industries such as computers, pharmaceuticals and telecommunications. For instance, in the computer industry, …rms specialize in di¤erent market layers, as it is rather di¢ cult for individual …rms to develop technological capabilities by relying solely on internal research (Cloodt et al., 2006) 
The model
We carry out our analysis in a modi…ed version of the R&D network formation model proposed by MSV. The key di¤erences with our model are the following. First, we postulate that both the downstream …rms and their upstream suppliers (labour unions in MSV) undertake process R&D investments. Second, we study simultaneously the stability of the upstream and downstream R&D networks. 8 Setting. Consider an industry consisting of three upstream and three downstream …rms denoted by U i and D i , i = 1; 2; 3, respectively (see Figure 1 , left panel). 9 One can think of the upstream …rms as being input suppliers and the downstream …rms as being …nal good manufacturers. Each upstream …rm U i maintains an exclusive relation with one of the downstream …rms D i . 10 Each downstream …rm buys an input from its upstream supplier at a unit price w i , and transforms it to the …nal product. The downstream marginal cost is initially constant at k; while each upstream …rm faces an initial marginal cost c, where 0 c + k < a. One unit of input produces exactly one unit of output, which is sold in the retail market under the (inverse) demand function:
evidence.
where p is the retail price and q i is the output of downstream …rm i (i = 1; 2; 3).
Collaboration networks. In an upstream and downstream triopoly, four distinct R&D networks may arise at each market tier -see Figure 1 (right panel). In the empty network (g e ),
there are no collaborative links between …rms; while in the complete network (g c ) each …rm has a link with the other two …rms. In the partial network (g p ), there is only one link, creating an insider/outsider pattern. Finally, in the star network (g s ), there is a hub …rm which is directly linked with the other two, spoke …rms; in turn, the spokes are indirectly linked with each other via the hub. 11 We shall write ij 2 g to represent the link between …rms i and j in a network g.
Let g + ij denote the new network when …rms i and j add a link to network g; and g ij the resulting network after i and j sever their link. 12
Input suppliers Marginal costs and R&D investments. By investing x 2 i and e 2 i in process R&D, …rm U i and D i , respectively, can attain unit production costs c x i and k + w i e i , where x i and e i denote a …rm's R&D output (e.g. d 'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988) . Note that the R&D cost function re ‡ects diminishing returns to the level of R&D investment/output, x i (e i , respectively). 13 Upstream and downstream …rms can reduce their production costs further by forming collaborative links. Such links allow …rms to access the R&D outputs of other horizontally related 1 1 Note that the partial and star networks are asymmetric architectures in that some of the …rms maintain more links than others. 1 2 Like the existing literature on R&D networks (e.g. Goyal and Moraga-González, 2001; Deroian and Gannon, 2006; Song and Vannetelbosch, 2007; MSV), we assume that the formation of collaboration links is costless. Goyal and Joshi (2003) provide related work which looks at the e¤ects of linking costs on the network architecture between oligopoly …rms. They do not endogenize R&D e¤orts so the level of cost reduction is exogenous as well. 1 3 This is a special case of the quadratic R&D cost function (say) (xi) = x 2 i , where > 0 denotes the e¢ ciency of the R&D technology. Clearly, the higher the lower is the level of technology e¢ ciency. For tractability, we set = 1 which ensures nonnegativity of all variables (see e.g. MSV; Goyal and Moraga-González, 2001).
…rms. Let the subscript u denote an upstream R&D network and the subscript d a downstream R&D network. Following MSV -and given a network pro…le (g n u ; g n d ), where n = c; p; s; e -the marginal cost of …rm U i and D i , respectively, is:
In eq. (2) and (3), 2 (0; 1] and 2 (0; 1] denote the rate of knowledge transmission within an upstream and downstream R&D network, respectively, i.e. within-network R&D spillovers. 14 Within-network spillovers depend on the "distance" between collaborating …rms, where t(ij)
refers to the distance between a pair of …rms i and j in terms of the number of links in the shortest path between them. Following again MSV, we set t(ij) = 1 to denote the absence of a path between …rms i and j. 15 From eq. (2) and (3), the "e¤ective" R&D output of …rm U i and D i , respectively, is:
This represents the overall reduction in a …rm's marginal cost as a result of R&D. It consists of …rm i's own R&D output, x i (respectively, e i ), and the sum of the R&D outputs that …rm i can access through collaborative links with other horizontally related …rms. 16 As eq. (4) and (5) suggest, …rm i can access only a proportion (respectively, ) of its partners'R&D outputs.
Pro…ts. For a given network pro…le, (g n u ; g n d ), the pro…ts of an upstream …rm U i and a downstream …rm D i are, respectively:
1 4 We thus allow spillovers at the two market tiers not to be necessarily of the same size. We note that potential di¤erences in the size of within-network spillovers can result from various sources, such as absorptive capacity and the e¢ ciency of communication channels between collaborating …rms (Attalah, 2002). 1 5 Note that if …rms i and j are directly linked, then t(ij) = 1. 1 6 For example, in an upstream complete network (say), XU i = xi + (xj + x k ), i 6 = j 6 = k, i; j; k 2 f1; 2; 3g.
The …rst term to the right of eq. (6) captures U i 's wholesale pro…t. Wholesale pro…t is the product of the sales volume (q i ) and the relevant wholesale pro…t margin. The wholesale pro…t margin is the di¤erence between the input price (w i ) that an upstream …rm charges and its marginal cost (c U i ). In turn, both the input price and marginal cost depend on the industry structure, (g n u ; g n d ), as well as the position of trading partners U i and D i within it.
Likewise, eq. (7) The timing above re ‡ects that the selection of collaborative links is a long-run and strategic decision for an upstream and a downstream …rm. This is motivated by the empirical observation that …rms ask for "strong commitment" from their partners (in terms of involvement and resources) in order to establish R&D alliances (Hagedoorn, 2002, p. 479) . 17 In addition, the timing above which is standard in the R&D network literature captures that the choice of the R&D investments is longer-run decision than the exact level of wholesale prices. This is because R&D activity is inherently uncertain, so it may require a relatively long time to come into fruition; while input prices can be changed more easily and more often (perhaps responding to small changes in market conditions).
Notation. We shall use the following notation throughout the article. Let the superscripts h and s denote, respectively, the hub and spoke …rms in a star network (g s ); and let the superscript 1 7 It is worth noting that, by asking for "strong commitment", …rms try to limit a potential failure of R&D alliances. The possibility that an R&D alliance fails may be related either with the highly uncertain nature of R&D activity or with strategic reasons such as an incentive for a …rm to terminate an agreement after it has bene…ted by more compared to its research partners (Narula and Hagedoorn, 1999) . In spite of this possibility, as Narula and Hagedoorn (2004, p. 202 ) point out, R&D alliances "stand out in terms of their e¤ectiveness" compared to other types of alliances (e.g. sales and marketing alliances).
l refer to a linked …rm in the partial network (g p ).
Main analysis
We solve the game backwards from stage 4 to stage 2. We then turn to the …rst stage for which we obtain the set of "stable" networks. To this end we use two well-established equilibrium concepts -"pairwise stability" and "strong stability".
Pairwise stability
A simple way to analyze which network architectures are likely to emerge in the present setting is to consider the concept of pairwise stability. Following Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), we say that a network is pairwise stable if no …rm has an incentive to delete unilaterally one of its links and no pair of …rms want to add a new link between them (with one bene…ting strictly and the other at least weakly).
Because there are 4 network structures that can possibly emerge at each market tier, there are 16 qualitatively di¤erent industry structures in the present setting. To pin down the pairwise stable industry structures we proceed as follows. We take as given the network structure at one of the market tiers, the downstream (say), and ask what network structures will endogenously emerge between the upstream …rms. 18 We then turn to study what R&D networks will arise between the downstream …rms for a given network between the upstream …rms. Finally, to determine the equilibrium R&D networks at both market tiers simultaneoulsy, we note that the network pro…le (g n u ; g n d ), where n = c; p; s; e, is "stable" if and only if the R&D network at one market tier is a best response to the R&D network at the other market tier.
We now characterize the set of pairwise stable networks. This tells us about the upstream and downstream …rms'incentives to form collaborative links. The following lemma summarizes our …ndings.
Lemma 1 In the parameter space ( ; ), the following industry structures emerge endogenously as pairwise stable:
for all parameter con…gurations.
(ii) (g Part (i) of the lemma asserts that at both market tiers -upstream and downstream -a complete R&D network is pairwise stable. Intuitively, in the star network, the spoke …rms are in a weaker competitive position vis-à-vis the hub …rm. Therefore, given a complete R&D network at a market tier, a …rm at the other market tier will not unilaterally sever a link to become a spoke in the star network. given a partial network at the other market tier. Likewise, even though the isolated …rm bene…ts by forming a link with an insider, linked …rm (to become a spoke in the star), it is the case that none of the insiders have an incentive to form such a link (to become the hub in the star). As lemma 1 suggests, an insider …rm will not form this link provided that spillovers within the upstream R&D network are su¢ ciently large; while spillovers within the downstream R&D network are su¢ ciently small. 1 9 We note that the C1, C2 and C3 curves are the set of ( ; ) values that solve the equations
The intuition behind the need for su¢ ciently large upstream and su¢ ciently small downstream spillovers can be explained as follows. Greater upstream spillovers imply that the competitive advantage of the linked …rms is more pronounced. To put it di¤erently, the insiders are 'strong'while the outsider is 'weak'when is large. Therefore, the linked …rms will have no incentive to o¤er a link to the isolated …rm.
The competitive advantage of the upstream linked …rms is transferred to their downstream counterparts through lower input prices. 20 As lemma 1 (ii) suggests, the downstream counterparts of the upstream linked …rms will form a partial R&D network as well. Interestingly, they will do so even though spillovers within the downstream R&D network are su¢ ciently small.
The reason is that the insider downstream …rms are relatively aggressive in product market competition as they face lower input prices than the outsider …rm. Therefore, they have no incentive to expand their partial R&D network. Consequently, only one link is established at the downstream market tier, and an insider/outsider formation results.
The most interesting result, though, is part (iii) of the lemma as it suggests that an asymmetric industry structure will be pairwise stable. In particular, a partial upstream network will coexist with a complete downstream network if spillovers within the upstream R&D network are su¢ ciently large. This industry structure arises for two primary reasons. First, in the partial network, the upstream linked …rms have no incentives to form a link with their isolated counterpart if within-network spillovers are su¢ ciently large. This is so because the competitive advantage of the linked …rms is relatively pronounced when is large. Second, the upstream isolated …rm does not su¤er a lot (even though is large), given that its downstream counterpart maintains an R&D link with both its rivals. Putting this last observation slightly di¤erently, the additional downstream link helps to compensate for the absence of an upstream link, thereby increasing the overall pro…t of this vertical chain with an isolated upstream …rm.
Strong stability
The concept of pairwise stability permits deviations only by a pair of …rms at a time. This suggests that if we enrich the network formation process to encompass deviations by a coalition of …rms, then it may no longer be the case that the same network architectures will materialize in equilibrium. Indeed, it may well be the case that a pairwise stable network is no longer strongly stable. 21 Following Jackson and Van de Nouweland (2005), we say that a network is strongly stable if it survives all possible changes in the number of its links by any coalition of …rms -because at least one …rm in the coalition would lose from the proposed group deviation.
This constitutes then a re…nement of the set of pairwise stable networks. The …nal network architectures of our network formation game are put forward in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In the parameter space ( ; ), the following industry structures emerge endogenously as strongly stable:
if is su¢ ciently small.
(ii) (g More speci…cally, the three upstream …rms will not jointly deviate to the empty network. However, a coalition of two upstream …rms has incentives to sever its links with the third …rm in order to form the partial network. As explained in the previous section (3.1), in the partial network, the linked …rms enjoy a substantial cost advantage over their rival. This cost advantage of the linked …rms becomes more pronounced as within-network spillovers increase.
As a result, the partial network destabilizes the complete network when spillovers are large.
Therefore, the upstream …rms will opt for a complete network only if within-network spillovers are su¢ ciently small, given a complete network at the downstream market tier. In contrast,
given a complete network at the upstream market tier, there will be no coalitional deviation by the downstream …rms to either the partial or the empty network. 2 1 Pairwise stability can be seen as a necessary condition for stability (see Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Goyal and Moraga-González, 2001). 2 2 We note that the curve C4 is the set of ( ; ) values that solve the equation U (g Given this, a pro…le of R&D networks (i.e. industry structure) emerges endogenously if and only if the R&D network at one market tier is a best response to the R&D network at the other market tier. Thus, a complete network at both market tiers will be a strongly stable architecture provided that within-the-upstream network spillovers are su¢ ciently low, as part (i) of proposition 1 reports.
Part (ii) of the proposition states that, at both market tiers, the partial R&D network between …rms 1 and 2, say, is strongly stable. This suggests that the two stability concepts provide identical predictions regarding the equilibrium industry structure in this case. As explained in the previous section on pairwise stable networks, the emergence of the partial network re ‡ects two factors. First, the competitive strength of the insider upstream …rms increases with a rise in the degree of spillovers within the network. This means that the insiders will have no incentives to expand their partial R&D network. Second, the competitive advantage of the insider upstream …rms is transferred to their downstream counterparts through lower input prices. In turn, the corresponding downstream …rms will also form a partial R&D network in order to retain this increased competitive strength. Because the downstream …rms are 'strong' enough in product market competition, they will form this partial R&D network even though within-the downstream network spillovers are relatively low.
Part (iii) of the proposition suggests that a partial upstream network might coexist with a complete downstream network. In particular, this asymmetric industry structure arises if within-the-upstream network spillovers are su¢ ciently large; while within-the-downstream network spillovers are intermediate. In the previous section (3.1), we saw that for this industry structure to emerge, there was only a requirement on the size of spillovers .
The intuition can be explained as follows. We …rst note that, given the R&D network at the downstream market tier, the upstream …rms will not deviate from the partial network.
However, it appears that, given the upstream R&D network, the downstream …rms will force a deviation from the complete to the partial network if spillovers are su¢ ciently large or small. Recall that because the upstream …rms 1 and 2, say, opt for a partial network, their downstream counterparts bene…t from the ensuing input price reductions. In turn, the lower input prices increase the competitive strength of the downstream …rms, 1 and 2. It turns out that if spillovers within the downstream network are su¢ ciently large, these downstream …rms will jointly sever their links with the third …rm in order to form a partial network. By doing so, they can retain their competitive advantage in product market competition over their rival.
Furthermore, the downstream …rms 1 and 2 will also deviate from the complete to the partial network as long as is su¢ ciently small. The reason is that small within-network spillovers mean that the downstream …rms 1 and 2 do not enjoy a substantial access to the R&D results of the third downstream …rm. Because …rms 1 and 2 already secure their inputs at a lower cost than the third …rm, proposition 1 implies that they will …nd it pro…table to break both their links with this …rm. Therefore, compared to the concept of pairwise stability, the coexistence of a partial upstream network and a complete downstream network becomes less likely and emerges only if is su¢ ciently large and is intermediate (rather than for any value).
Together, lemma 1 and proposition 1 seem to suggest that within-network upstream spillovers are more important than downstream spillovers in determining the equilibrium industry structures. For example, part (i) of the proposition requires a quali…cation only on the size of upstream spillovers to pin down the strongly stable industry structure. Likewise, part (ii) of the proposition suggests that a partial downstream network -given a partial upstream networkis likely to emerge when downstream spillovers are small; but an additional requirement is that upstream spillovers are large. Of course, a task for future empirical work is a thorough testing of this theoretical prediction that seems to be relevant in the present setting.
Further analysis
In this section we consider some aspects of aggregate performance, focusing …rst on the aggregate level of e¤ective R&D. Evaluating the di¤erent networks in terms of aggregate e¤ective R&D is important because more R&D implies lower costs and therefore higher input/output quantities.
The resulting decrease in product prices may also bene…t consumers.
By comparing the aggregate level of e¤ective R&D under each strongly stable industry structure against the other possible industry structures, we can state the following proposition. An asymmetric industry structure -a partial upstream network and a complete downstream network -is desirable in terms of aggregate e¤ective R&D; in contrast, the other two, symmetric, structures are never optimal. As proposition 2 suggests, these industry structures are actually dominated by industry structures that contain a smaller number of collaborative links. For instance, we …nd that an empty network at both market tiers generates higher aggregate e¤ective R&D than the corresponding industry structure where complete networks are strongly stable.
We now consider industry pro…ts. We say that an industry structure is strongly e¢ cient if it secures at least as high an aggregate level of pro…ts as any other industry structure; that is,
where n = c; p; s; e. We note that the strongly e¢ cient industry structures are not easily characterized in the present setting as it proves rather di¢ cult to provide a pro…t ranking of all possible industry structures. 23 Instead, we examine whether there are parameter con…gurations for which the strongly stable industry structures can maximize industry pro…ts -and thus are strongly e¢ cient. The following proposition summarizes our …ndings.
Proposition 3
Neither of the strongly stable industry structures is strongly e¢ cient.
Proposition 3 implies that individual and collective interests for R&D collaboration do never coincide. It is worth noting that such misalignment is particularly severe when either complete or partial networks arise at both market tiers, i.e. (g c u ; g c d ) and (g p u (ij); g p d (ij)). In both cases, it appears that a fairly wide variety of industry structures can secure higher aggregate pro…ts. 24 2 3 Recall that there are 16 possible industry structures in the present setting. 2 4 For example, the industry structure (g However, when the partial upstream network and the complete downstream network are strongly stable, then 'only' one industry structure performs better in terms of aggregate pro…ts -the star upstream network and the complete downstream network, (g s u ; g c d ).
The divergence between individual and collective interests seems particularly pronounced in the present setting. For this reason, we would like to explore this result further by examining social welfare under the strongly stable industry structures. We shall de…ne social welfare in the usual way, as the sum of consumer surplus, upstream and downstream …rms'pro…ts. Social welfare under an industry structure (g n u ; g n d ) is thus given by:
where
. To compute social welfare under the di¤erent networks, we substitute into (8) the equilibrium outcomes for output and …rm pro…ts. 
Discussion
The aim of this section is to discuss both the relation of our results to the literature and certain assumptions of the model. We …rst consider the performance of the stable network formations in terms aggregate e¤ective R&D investment. Our analysis here complements Song and Vannetelbosch (2007), who consider a model of international R&D collaboration among three …rms located in di¤erent countries. The authors …nd -in line with us -that stable networks do not perform well in terms of aggregate e¤ective R&D. 25 Taking the next step, the authors also show that a government policy in the form of R&D subsidies increases e¤ective R&D investment. In the present article, we …nd that, an asymmetric industry structure within a two-tier setting -a partial upstream network and a complete downstream network -produces the highest aggregate level of e¤ective R&D when it emerges as strongly stable.
We now consider the relationship between strongly stable, industry-pro…t maximizing and/or welfare-maximizing networks. Taken together, propositions 1, 3 and 4 imply that, in the pursuit of their private interests, the downstream …rms and their upstream suppliers cannot collectively achieve a pro…t-maximizing outcome but, under certain conditions, may achieve a welfare- As a caveat to our conclusions above, we note that an important assumption of the model is that upstream and downstream …rms are locked into exclusive relations. This assumption can be justi…ed by assuming that, prior to their network formation decisions, the two parties have undertaken relationship-speci…c investments (see Symeonidis, 2008) . Such investments, which would prevent the two parties from breaking up, are a common feature of the Japanese automobile industry, where automakers often engage in high-commitment relationships with their suppliers. 26 In this context, both parties undertake large …xed investments, such as investments 2 5 In particular, Song and Vannetelbosch (2007) demonstrate that the stable R&D networks -a complete and a partial network -generate a lower aggregate level of e¤ective R&D than the empty network. In the present setting, we also con…rm that the empty network at both market tiers outperforms the corresponding complete networks in terms of aggregate e¤ective R&D. 2 6 As Helper and Levine (1992) note, U.S. automakers have also moved progressively towards long-term rela-on ‡exible automation, information ‡ow mechanisms and quality control training (Helper and Levine, 1992 ).
On the other hand, as Narula and Dysters (2004, p. 207) point out, "…rms seek partnerships in response to similar moves made by other …rms in the same industry, not always because there are sound economic rationale in doing so, but in imitation of their competitors". 27 In turn, this could be a reason behind a potential failure of R&D alliances, as some partners might appear dishonest by terminating an agreement after they have appropriated important technologies (Narula and Hagedoorn, 1999) . 28 In that sense, relationships between downstream …rms and their upstream suppliers might be longer term than horizontal R&D collaborations and, as such, they tend to increase switching costs and create "lock-in". Indeed, Helper and Levine (1992, p. 563) point out that in the context of the Japanese automobile industry: "As long as the supplier continues to meet the automaker's expectations, the supplier can count on the relationship continuing inde…nitely."
We next turn to discuss whether the downstream …rms and their upstream suppliers have incentives for vertical integration in the present setting. To understand this, we note that vertical integration creates an e¢ ciency e¤ect. That is, it eliminates the double marginalization problem and thereby transforms the vertically integrated unit into a more aggressive competitor in the retail market. Similarly, investments in cost reducing R&D and/or R&D collaboration imply an e¢ ciency-enhancing e¤ect, which also tends to expand the output base of the collaborating …rms. Notice the presence of complementarities between greater output and lower costs: more output makes the bene…t from lower costs more pronounced, and lower costs make output increases more valuable. 29 Therefore, due to a larger output base, lower marginal cost …rms (as a result of R&D collaboration) will …nd it more pro…table to vertically integrate compared to their non-collaborating counterparts. We conclude that horizontal R&D networks are likely to strengthen …rms'incentives for vertical integration. 30 tionships with their suppliers, thereby enhancing their overall e¢ ciency.
Conclusion
Over the last thirty years, we witnessed a substantial increase in the number of R&D collaborations through networks. Such networks are often observed in vertically related industries. In We have also examined the implications of the stable networks formations for aggregate e¤ective R&D, industry pro…ts and social welfare. Our analysis suggests that, in the pursuit of their private interests, the downstream …rms and their upstream suppliers cannot collectively achieve a pro…t-maximizing outcome. In spite of this negative e¤ect, we have found that, under certain conditions, both an e¤ective R&D-maximizing and a welfare-maximizing outcome can be attained but only under the partial upstream and the complete downstream R&D network.
The potential divergence between private and collective interests for R&D collaboration implies that there is room for public policy. As a general policy prescription, our analysis suggests that the structure of the upstream and the downstream network might be as important for designing public policy as the extent of within-network R&D spillovers. Further developments in this area could consider more general demand and cost structures, informational asymmetries partial R&D networks (that exclude both an upstream and a downstream …rm).
and alternative forms of wholesale and retail competition. These extensions which are beyond the scope of the present paper are promising avenues for future research.
We …rst note that, given the R&D network at the downstream market tier (i.e. g c
